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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-403 (Lexis Nexis 2012) as a formal appeal from the 
Utah Labor Commission. Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-403 (Lexis Nexis 2012); R.1203-08. 
ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW 1 
Whether the Labor Commission erred (1) in not addressing Snyder's claim that he 
was underpaid benefits in 2002; (2) in not addressing Snyder's inability to participate in 
the subrogation lawsuit between the insurance companies; (3) in adopting the Medical 
Panel report; ( 4) in allowing evidence of rowing to be sent to the Medical Panel; ( 5) in 
concluding that the need for the total shoulder replacement and subsequent impairment 
was not industrial in nature and (5) in holding Snyder to the same standard as a lawyer. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The court reviews actions regarding the hearing of claims and the receipt of 
evidence for an abuse of discretion to ensure that it falls within the bounds of 
reasonableness. See Murray v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38,, 32, 308 P.3d 461. 
The court reviews determinations of whether a claim for benefits is compensable as a 
mixed question of law and fact. Ibid. 
STATUTES, RULES APPLICABLE TO APPEAL 
Utah Code Section 630-4-403 and R602-2-2-2.B.2. 
1 Synder identifies issues but then fails to address the same topics in the argument section of the brief. Appellee has 
reworded the issues where necessary to try to address the issue which were both identified and briefed. Specifically, 
the question of whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law were "legally inadequate'' was not actually 
briefed and so it was ignored. In contrast, the question of whether the shoulder replacement is a compensable injury 
was not identified as an issue but it was briefed and so appellee addressed it. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Snyder ("Snyder") appeals the Utah Labor Commission denial of 
additional workers compensation benefits. On July 7, 1999, Snyder was struck by a 
hammer which fell 70 feet and struck him in the shoulder while he was working in an 
elevator shaft. R.1136. Snyder was employed by Western Construction Specialist 
("Western") at the time of the accident and Western was insured by Fremont Insurance 
Group ("Fremont"). R.1136. Fremont went bankrupt and Fremont's accounts, including 
Snyder's, were assumed by the Utah Property and Casualty Guaranty Association 
( collectively, the employer and insurance companies, are referred to herein as 
"UPCIGA"). R.17. UPCIGA is the party defending the suit presently. UPCIGA 
originally accepted responsibility for the injury but has subsequently questioned the 
relatedness of the total shoulder replacement and impairment rating. The parties attended 
a hearing in this matter and both parties presented evidence. R.1211. During that 
hearing, there was some confusion regarding Snyder's average weekly wage but 
ultimately evidence that Snyder was paid $509 per week for his temporary total benefits 
was received into evidence. R.1211, pp. 97-98. Similarly, at the hearing Snyder claimed 
that several important medical records were missing from the joint medical records 
exhibit ("MRE"). Snyder presented all of his medical records during the hearing and 7 
missing pages were added to the MRE. R.1211, pp. 73:24-74:5; 82:11-19. With 
Snyder's consent, the court closed the record and ordered the matter to a Medical Panel. 
R.1211, pp. 82:16-83:3; 105:2. The Medical Panel concluded that Snyder's need for 
right shoulder replacement was not caused by or made worse by the 1999 industrial 
2 
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accident. R.586. Snyder objected to the Medical Panel report claiming that he had not 
been allowed to submit any medical records at the hearing and that the opinions of the 
doctors offered by UPCIGA were "lies" and "fabricated." R.835; R.l 026. The court 
admitted the Medical Panel report into evidence (R.1136) and then concluded that the 
shoulder replacement was not industrial and dismissed Snyder's application for hearing. 
R.1140. Snyder appealed and the matter was affirmed by the Appeals Board. R.1203. 
Snyder now appeals to this Court. 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion by not addressing 
Snyder's claim that he was underpaid benefits in 2002. The ALJ and the Appeals Board 
both noted that Snyder was paid the maximum rate allowed for all benefits. Likewise, 
the Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion in declining to address Snyder's 
complaint that he was not allowed to participate in the subrogation suit between 
insurance companies. The Labor Commission is a court of limited jurisdiction and it is 
not authorized to address whether these insurance companies breached any duties to 
Snyder 15 years ago. 
The Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the 
Medical Panel report. Snyder's objections to the report were not directed at the report 
itself but were claims that he was not given a chance to submit evidence at the hearing 
and that he did not like the opinions of Drs. Hess and Marble being sent to the Medical 
Panel (because he believed them to be "fabricated" and "fraudulent"). These are not 
2Snyder undertook another interlocutory appeal as well but it was summarily dismissed as premature. 
3 
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valid objections to the report and the Labor Commission properly allowed the Medical 
Panel report into evidence. 
Snyder claims that the findings of the ALJ that rowing may have contributed to his 
shoulder arthritis was not supported by the evidence but this is not true. The Medical 
Record Exhibit is replete with medical records where Snyder and his medical doctors 
discuss his rowing activities and the fact that rowing aggravated his shoulder pain. 
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support these findings by the 
ALJ. 
Snyder also asserts that there is not substantial evidence to support the conclusion 
that his shoulder arthritis is not industrial in nature. While it is true that there is some 
evidence to support Snyder's position, he fails to recognize that the preponderance of the 
evidence supports the conclusion that at the time of the 1999 accident he had already 
started developing shoulder arthritis ( as evidenced by a cyst that showed up 3 months 
after the accident) and that this progressed naturally, but separately, from his industrial 
injury. 
Lastly, Snyder asks that the Court provided him with special treatment because he 
is a non-lawyer. This is not the standard in the community. The Labor Commission 
reasonably held Snyder to page-length requirements and there was no abuse of discretion 
in doing so. 
For each of these reasons, the Labor Commission's ruling should be affirmed. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
1. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOT TO HEAR CLAIM FOR ALLEGED 
UNDERPAID BENEFITS OR ALLEGED CLAIM REGARDING 
SUBROGATION. 
Snyder claims that the Labor Commission erred in not addressing his claim that he 
was shorted benefits in 2002. The Utah Labor Commission has broad discretion to 
administer and regulate itself pursuant to its own governing statutes and regulations. See 
generally, Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 71, 222 P.3d 55; Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 401, ,r 7, 122 P.3d 700 (noting that the 
Labor Commission has statutory authority to make rules governing adjudicative 
procedures). Accordingly, the decision not to address this issue is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. Ibid. 
Here, Snyder filed an application for hearing raising the issue of the alleged 2002 
under-payment only after the May 18, 2015, hearing had already occurred. R.1133. 
When the newly assigned Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") reviewed the application 
for hearing, he deemed it an untimely motion to amend the application for hearing on a 
matter that had already been heard and upon which the record was already closed. 
R.1133-34. This was a reasonable conclusion and one which the Appeals Board 
affirmed. R.1206. It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to address this issue but it 
might be helpful to understand how the issue originally arose. The confusion arose 
during the hearing itself but Snyder doesn't seem to realize (or will not accept) this 
confusion was cleared up during the May 15, 2015, hearing. R.1211, pp. 97:8-98:21. 
5 
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Snyder's prior counsel and Appellee had incorrectly stipulated to a wage rate that 
was too low and which did not comport with Snyder's claimed wage of $20.00 per hour, 
but Appellee tried to correct this error at the hearing. R.1211, pp. 97:8-98:21. At the 
hearing, Appellee explained that both the employer and the original insurance company 
were out of business and that the claim was so old, the records were lacking, however, 
Appellee offered exhibit R-3 into evidence to support past payments to Snyder. R.1211, 
pp. 97:8-98:21. As was explained at the hearing, the payments in R-3 were labeled 
"Perm" for payment for permanent partial disability and "Temp" for payment for 
temporary total disability. R.1211, pp. 97:8-98:21; see also R.1186-1187. As this ledger 
shows, Snyder was paid $1,018.00 bi-weekly for temporary total disability and that this is 
equal to $509.00 per week, or the maximum rate which he could have been paid at the 
time of his accident. Id. Accordingly, Snyder was paid the maximum allowable 
temporary total disability rate at the time of his accident. R.1206. So, in essence, the 
original judge did address Snyder's claim that he thought that he was shorted disability 
payments because she concluded that he was paid the maximum amount allowed by 
statute and included this in her interim order. R.331. The Appeals Board likewise noted 
that "Mr. Snyder was already receiving the maximum rate for disability compensation." 
R.1206. Accordingly, Snyder's complaints lack merit and are not grounds for reversal of 
the Labor Commission's ruling. 
Next, Snyder argues that the Labor Commission should have addressed the fact 
that he was not allowed to participate in the subrogation lawsuit between insurance 
carriers involving his underlying injury. The Labor Commission is a court of limited 
6 
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• 
jurisdiction and addressing whether these insurance carriers breached any duty to Snyder 
goes well beyond its jurisdiction. Snyder would have to bring a separate lawsuit in 
district court against the insurance companies to address these issues. The Labor 
Commission did not abuse its discretion when it declined to address this issue. The 
Appeals Board advised Snyder of this in its ruling and the failure to address this topic is 
not grounds for reversal of the Labor Commission's ruling. RI 206. 
2. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE MEDICAL 
PANEL REPORT. 
Next, Snyder claims that the Labor Commission abused its discretion in admitting 
the Medical Panel report into evidence. In Right Way Trucking, LLC v. Labor 
Commission, 2015 UT App 210, 357 P.3d 1024, the Court addressed the steps taken once 
a Medical Panel report is drafted and stated as follows: 
Id. 110. 
After a medical panel has completed its report, "if a written 
objection to the report is filed ... the administrative law judge 
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues 
involved." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(f)(i) 
(LexisNexis Supp.2013). An ALJ's decision whether to admit 
a medical panel report into evidence or to hold an objection 
hearing is entirely discretionary, and we will provide relief 
only when "a reasonable basis for that decision is not 
apparent from the record." Borja v. Labor Comm'n, 2014 UT 
App 123, 1 9, 327 P.3d 1223 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Here, as below, Snyder challenges the Medical Panel report but he doesn't really 
explain what is wrong with the Medical Panel report other than to state that it relies upon 
the opinions of Drs. Hess and Marble (with which he disagrees) and relies upon the MRE 
(which he claims is missing key evidence (but which he fails to identify)). As the Labor 
7 
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Commission noted in its original ruling, the only real criticism of the report itself seems 
to be that he objects to the following language '"a hammer fell, grazing his shoulder.' 
(emphasis added). The Court finds this argument to be unpersuasive because the Medical 
Panel explained that 'the type of bruise and abrasion that occurred ... from the hammer 
fall could not possibly have caused ... degenerative arthritis .... " R.1135. The ALJ then 
explained, "Petitioner's disagreement with the Medical Panel's usage of the term 
'grazing' does not negate the fact that the Medical Panel understood the basic facts of the 
mechanism of injury; namely that a hammer fell several floors and hit Petitioner's 
shoulder." R.1135. The Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion when it admitted 
the Medical Panel report into evidence and Snyder has not identified any real grounds for 
why it should not have been admitted into evidence. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to admit the Medical Panel report into evidence and this is not grounds to 
reverse the Labor Commission's denial of benefits. 
In this section of his brief, Snyder also claims that "[t]the Labor Commission erred 
in not allowing Snyder to enter all his relevant medical exhibits into the MRE." Seep. 44 
of Snyder's Appellate brief. A review of the hearing transcript will illustrate that Snyder 
appeared at the hearing with various medical records which he wanted to have admitted 
into evidence. The ALJ painstakingly compared each medical record to the MRE and 
determined that all such records were in the MRE except for 7 pages which the ALJ 
received into evidence. R.1211 and R.1042-1045 (for a discussion of the alleged missing 
pages of the MRE). The ALJ also took notice of the fact that Snyder had had low back 
surgery and had been unable to work at the time that he was seen by Dr. Hess. R.1211, 
8 
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p.79-80. Ultimately, Snyder agreed that the evidence at the hearing should be closed and 
that the MRE was complete and that the ALJ could rule upon the case. R.1211, 82:16-
83:3. Snyder's claims regarding the MRE are without merit. The Labor Commission did 
not abuse its discretion when it admitted the Medical Panel report into evidence and this 
Court should affirm. 
3. FACTUAL FINDINGS REGARDING ROWING WERE SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Snyder's next argument is hard to understand but seems to be that the findings by 
the ALJ that rowing contributed to Snyder's arthritic shoulder were not supported by the 
evidence. The following are citations to the record which disproves this claim and shows 
that ample evidence of rowing was introduced at trial and that there was evidence to 
support the conclusions reached by the ALJ's conclusions that the rowing contributed to 
Snyder's shoulder complaints: 
(1) R.1210 p. 57-58 ("likes to row and does a lot of rafting trips"); 
(2) R.1210 p.61 ("went rowing and significantly stirred things up"); 
(3) R.1210 p.63(had two long rowing trips planned); 
( 4) R.1210 p. 71 ("felt quite sore after rowing Grand Canyon"); 
(5) R.1210 p. 163 Dr. Marble's IME report dated January 14, 2003, at page 4 
notes that "Dr. Petron's documentation from 07/23/01 suggests this gentleman's 
condition had been aggravated by a kayaking trip."; and 
9 
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(6) R.1210 p.163 Dr. Marble's IME report also states that the "operative findings 
do appear consistent with chronic impingement and physically taxing work as an iron 
worker." 
Contrary to Snyder's claim, these conclusions were not "manufactured" but were 
supported by evidence in the record. This claim is without merit. 
4. THE LABOR COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE NEED FOR 
SHOULDER REPLACEMENT WAS NOT INDUSTRIAL IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Next, Snyder argues that the conclusion that his shoulder injury is not industrial is 
not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Snyder cites all the evidence in the 
file which supports his conclusion that the July 7, 1999, accident caused his shoulder 
injury but fails to address or distinguish the evidence that contradicts this evidence. 
Snyder spends considerable time addressing Drs. Hess and Marble's opinions but fails to 
understand that the truly relevant opinion is that of the Medical Panel from which the 
Labor Commission sought guidance. The ALJ noted as follows: 
The Court finds that a preponderance of the evidence supports 
the finding of the medical panel report. Regarding the finding 
of preexisting degenerative arthritis, this is support by Dr. 
Petron's opinion [MRE, p. 37] The panel's conclusion that 
Petitioner did not experience a traumatic tear and that there 
were no fractures caused by the industrial accident is 
supported by the opinions of the Work Care provider and Dr. 
Hess. [MRE, pp. 38, 171-173] The panel's finding that 
repetitive factors unrelated to the industrial accident 
contributed to Petitioner's shoulder condition is supported by 
Dr. Hess's conclusion. [MRE, pp. 179-180]. Furthermore, 
the Court finds that all of the medical panel's findings are 
persuasive because the medical panel report is the product of 
collegial and impartial review of Petitioner's relevant medical 
history. The medical panel had access to all of Petitioner's 
10 
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relevant medical records and personally examined Petitioner. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court adopts the findings of the 
medical panel report. 
Having adopted the findings of the medical panel report, the 
Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence shows that 
Petitioner's preexisting shoulder condition, need for right 
shoulder arthroplasty and additional 11 % impairment rating, 
were all unrelated to the industrial accident. . . . . Petitioner 
cannot establish medical causation and as such, Petitioner 
does not qualify for the benefits he seeks in his June 19, 2014 
Application for Hearing. Therefore, the Court shall dismiss 
Petitioner's claim. 
R.1139; R.1140. 
The Appeals Board reviewed the file and responded to Snyder's claim that the 
arthritic changes to his shoulder were caused by the industrial accident. R.1206. The 
Appeals Board noted as follows: 
There is some evidence of a medical casual connection 
between Mr. Snyder's current right-shoulder condition and 
the accident in the form of Dr. Greis' s opinion, but such 
evidence is countered by the preponderance of the evidence. 
The medical panel determined Mr. Snyder had significant 
degenerative changes in his right shoulder even before the 
work accident and that his work injury did not contribute to 
his degenerative arthritis or need for arthroplasty. The 
panel's opinion on this point is support by that of Dr. Hess, 
who noted that Mr. Snyder's MRI results showed 
degenerative changes apart from the impingement syndrome 
resulting from the accident. 
R.1207. Snyder totally discounts the fact that only 3 months after his accident a cyst was 
noted on his shoulder which shows that at that time he already had degenerative shoulder 
arthritis. R.1210 p. 2. There is sufficient evidence in the record (in the form of the MRI, 
the Medical Panel report, and Drs. Hess and Marble's opinions) to support the Labor 
11 
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Commission's conclusions. Accordingly, the conclusion reached by the Labor 
Commission is supported by substantial evidence and there are no grounds for reversal. 
5. SNYDER'S STATUS AS A PRO SE LITIGANT IS IRRELEVANT. 
Lastly, Snyder claims that the Labor Commission erred in not giving Snyder 
special consideration since he was representing himself. This claim is without merit. 
Snyder elected to terminate his attorney and to represent himself. He has filed repeated 
appeals and repeated motions. His arguments are repetitive and have been addressed 
many times. Snyder has identified no harm from being asked to follow the same 
procedural rules which Appellee is asked to follow. Ironically, at the time when Snyder's 
brief was cut for being too long-Appellees' brief was cut as well. R.1134. Both parties 
were held to the same standard. Most importantly, Snyder has not identified how the 
failure to review the balance of his brief actually harmed him. This omission is 
catastrophic to his claim. The Labor Commission has the discretion to apply its own 
rules and regulations and applying the page limits set forth in Utah Administrative Code 
R602-2-2-2.B.2 was not an abuse of that discretion. See generally, Frito-Lay v. Utah 
Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT 71, 222 P.3d 55; Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2005 UT App 401,, 7, 122 P.3d 700 (noting that the Labor Commission has 
statutory authority to make rules governing adjudicative procedures). This claim is 
without merit and is not grounds for reversal. 
12 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For each of the reasons set forth herein, UPI GA asks that this Court affirm the 
Labor Commission's dismissal of Snyder's application for additional worker's 
compensation benefits. 
~ 
DATED this 31 day of January 2017 
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